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STATSPEC 27 JAN 1971 FRIENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

27 JANUARY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 4)

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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 18 - 24 JANUARY 1971

Moscow (3374 items)

Podgorny in UAR for Aswan Dam Commission- ing	(18%)	11%
Indochina	(5%)	7%
Luna 17, Lunakhod	(5%)	5%
U.S. "Zionist" Anti- Soviet Activities	(3%)	4%
China	(3%)	4%
Czechoslovak CP Document on 1968- 69 Events	(3%)	4%
Italian CP, 50th Anniversary	(0.1%)	2%
Commonwealth Con- ference in Singapore	(2%)	2%

Peking (2820 items)

Indochina	(14%)	34%
[Cambodia	(4%)	17%]
[Lao People's Liberation Anniversary	(1%)	6%]
Domestic Issues	(38%)	29%
[Anhwei Party Congress	(--)	2%
[Liaoning Party Congress	(1%)	1%
Latin American Territorial Waters	(0.03%)	8%
Equatorial Guinea Government Delega- tion in PRC	(0.03%)	6%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi keeps high-level attention focused on the U.S. role in the "war of aggression" in Cambodia with a government statement released on 24 January, five days after a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on U.S. action throughout Indochina had claimed that "massive operations" in Cambodia have been conducted "under direct U.S. command." The statement observes that Secretary Laird on the 20th "brazenly declared" that the United States would continue to use its air and naval forces in Cambodia. It claims that "intensification of U.S. aggression" is aimed, in vain, at saving the Phnom Penh "henchmen" from complete collapse and the Nixon Doctrine from failure.

The PRG has not issued a statement on Cambodia at the government level, although it had followed the DRV lead when it issued its 20 January foreign ministry statement condemning U.S. action in Cambodia and throughout Indochina. The most authoritative Front comment on Cambodia is a message from NLF SV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat congratulating Sihanouk and Penn Nouth on the recent "great victories" of the Cambodian "patriotic armed forces" on Highway 4 and in Phnom Penh. Cambodian developments also prompt a flurry of statements from Sihanouk and his government and front protesting U.S. involvement and hailing the exploits of the insurgents.

Peking offers high-level comment in a foreign ministry statement on the 25th endorsing the earlier DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements and charging that the Nixon Administration "is flagrantly clamoring that it will not be restricted in committing acts of aggression in Indochina." In this connection, an NCNA commentary on the 24th levels a vehement attack at Secretary Laird's 20 January remarks on the use of U.S. air and naval power.

Moscow to date has issued no authoritative statement on the increased use of air power in Indochina and the increased U.S. support role in Cambodia. However, routine propaganda continues to cite statements by Secretary Laird, including his press conference remarks on the 20th, as evidence of U.S. "escalation"; and propagandists note that domestic opposition to the Administration's Indochina policy is mounting.

DRV STATEMENT, FRONT MESSAGE SCORE NEW U.S. ACTS IN CAMBODIA

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT The 24 January DRV Government statement, like earlier propaganda, links U.S. intensification of the "aggression" with the "massive increase" of American military aid to Phnom Penh and the subsequent

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trips of Secretary Laird to Saigon and Admiral Moorer to Cambodia.*

The statement reiterates the charge in the DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the 19th that allied military operations on Cambodian Highway 4 are "under U.S. command." It goes on to score U.S. bombing in Cambodia and support for allied operations there by the Seventh Fleet, and it describes as "brazen" Secretary Laird's 20 January remarks on the continued use of U.S. air and sea power in Cambodia. The statement says "it is clear that the Nixon Administration has grossly trampled underfoot the sacred national rights of the Khmer people, the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Cambodia, and all elementary norms of international law." Echoing the foreign ministry statement of the 19th, it denounces President Nixon's five-point peace initiative as a "mere deception."

Hailing Cambodian insurgent "victories," the government statement claims that the achievements of the "Cambodian national liberation armed forces" have, over the past months, landed the Lon Nol regime "in an extremely critical situation." It endorses the 18 January appeal from Sihanouk and his government and front and the 20 January statement of RGNU and FUNK, and it concludes that the Vietnamese "are determined to persist in and step up their struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation, and to stand shoulder to shoulder with the fraternal Khmer people so as to fight together and together lead the just cause of the two countries to complete victory."

NFLSV/PRG The most authoritative South Vietnamese communist MESSAGE comment on Cambodia is a message from Front Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat congratulating Sihanouk and Penn Nouth on the recent "great victories" of the Cambodian "patriotic armed forces." Insurgent achievements on Highway 4 and in Phnom Penh are

* DRV statements at the government level in recent months have been confined to Cambodian developments. Thus, most recently, a DRV Government statement issued on 15 October condemned the Phnom Penh announcement on formation of the Khmer Republic. The U.S. incursion into Cambodia prompted a government statement on 2 May, and a 25 March 1970 statement condemned the coup which ousted Sihanouk.

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particularly praised, and the message asserts that these "brilliant victories" are "due answers to the cunning schemes and perfidious and barbarous tricks of the Nixon Administration, which is intensifying and extending the war of aggression in Cambodia" Like Hanoi, the Front and PRG leaders endorse recent statements by Sihanouk and the FUNK and RGNU and pledge to stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the Cambodian and Lao peoples.

"VICTORIES" IN CAMBODIA HAILED; LON NOL SAIGON TRIP ASSAILED

MILITARY ACTION Vietnamese communist media have not acknowledged the allied recapture of Pich Nil Pass on 21 January in the course of the allied clearing operation along Highway 4. But commentaries do take note of reports of fighting at the pass, stressing the number of casualties allegedly inflicted on allied forces. And Hanoi and Front commentaries cite an 18 January AFP dispatch for the observation "even if the Lon Nol forces reach the summit of Pich Nil, the fighting in the area will not be over." An article in the 22 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN broadcast in excerpts by Hanoi on the same day, reviewing action along Highway 4 since July 1970, says the government troops are still being checked in their efforts to take Pich Nil Pass. It observes that the insurgents occupied the pass at a time when government forces were "deadlocked" on Highways 6 and 7 to the north and northeast of Phnom Penh.

Like other comment, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article links the launching of the allied operation on Highway 4 with the visits of Secretary Laird to Saigon and of Admiral Moorer to Phnom Penh. It reiterates claims that the allied operation was "violently counterattacked" and that some 1,500 allied troops were put out of action in the engagements from 1 through 15 January. The article concludes that "by pinning down thousands of enemy troops along Highways 6 and 7, by repeatedly harassing the enemy on the Mekong River, by exerting control on Highway 1, by cutting Highway 5, and by vigorously fighting the enemy on Highway 4, the Cambodia armed forces and people are driving the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen into a defensive position and bitter defeats."

Citing Western news reports, Vietnamese communist media on the 22d hail that morning's communist attack on the Phnom Penh airport, which "virtually destroyed" the air force, and on the

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23d took note of other insurgent attacks around the Cambodian capital: the 22 January attack on a naval base east of Phnom Penh and bombing of the South Vietnamese ambassador's residence, and the 23 January bombing of a police station. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary and a Liberation Radio commentary on the 23d declare that the airport attack was "well coordinated" with attacks on Highway 4 and praise the "resourceful" and "flexible" fighting methods of the Cambodian forces. Both maintain that U.S. bombs and ammunition have proven useless, and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN asserts that "the Americans and Saigon puppets are unable to save the Lon Nol clique, which is becoming increasingly isolated and weakened."

An article in NHAN DAN, summarized in a Hanoi domestic broadcast on the 24th, claims that the airport attack was carried out "with the assistance and protection of the people." It notes that Cambodian Government troops operating on Highway 4 are being withdrawn to return to protect the capital. The attack on the airport continues to be acclaimed, with commentaries in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 26 January.

LON NOL TRIP The NHAN DAN article on the 24th and other comment note that the attack on the Phnom Penh airport occurred soon after Lon Nol's return from his trip to Saigon. Observing that "Lon Nol escaped death but his aircraft was hit and exploded," NHAN DAN says "that was the Khmer people's stern warning to this vicious traitor."

Other comment on Lon Nol's 20-21 January Saigon visit includes a 20 January Liberation Radio commentary which calls it a "crime-studded trip" to collude in the implementation of the "U.S. plan to intensify and spread the war to all of Indochina and to carry out the Nixon doctrine to use Indochinese to fight Indochinese." Calling Lon Nol a "notorious murderer," it says that the GVN leaders, by receiving him, are exposed as "unscrupulous low-class individuals who have sold their souls to the Americans." A Hanoi radio commentary on the 23d describes the trip as "a new step in an alliance aimed at coordinating U.S. war acts in Cambodia and South Vietnam." It stresses reports of continuing differences between the Phnom Penh and Saigon regimes, claiming that Lon Nol brought with him a list of complaints about the actions of South Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia and that the GVN presented him with a demand for more than 20 million dollars in expenditures for the South Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia.

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PHNOM PENH PROPOSAL TO TRADE POW'S FOR NEWSMEN REJECTED

A Phnom Penh proposal on 21 January that Vietnamese communist prisoners of war be exchanged for foreign journalists missing in Cambodia is attacked at length in a 23 January Hanoi domestic broadcast and rejected in a 24 January DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest against the Cambodian Government's "persecution and arrest" of Vietnamese. (A similar PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest on the 23d made no mention of the proposal.) The DRV spokesman endorses a 5 January RGNU spokesman's statement which held that the Lon Nol government must bear responsibility for journalists missing in Cambodia.

The 23 January broadcast dismisses the suggestion of an exchange as a "psychological warfare trick" and charges that Lon Nol "fabricated the tale of 'North Vietnamese and Viet Cong POW's' in Cambodia" in order to accuse the Vietnamese of being aggressors and to "conceal the crimes of Americans who have frantically stepped up the war of aggression in Cambodia." The radio claims that Lon Nol's regime is also trying to "evade its responsibility to insure the safety of foreign newsmen stationed in Cambodia." It adds that "this trick of Lon Nol is also linked to the campaign on 'the PCW question' noisily raised by the Nixon Administration in the recent past with a view to misleading and concealing the U.S. imperialists' military adventures in Vietnam and in the whole of Indochina."

The radio reiterates the stand of the RGNU statement in early January which held that the RGNU, the FUNK, and the "liberation" forces were relieved of all responsibility for "accidents that might happen on the battlefields to newsmen allowed by the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique to enter Cambodia." Like the statement, it adds that "real newsmen" have been treated well and released, although they did not have RGNU permission to enter "liberated areas."

SIHANOUK DEPLORES U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST "LIBERATION ARMY"

The military developments in Cambodia have elicited a series of statements from Sihanouk and his government (RGNU) and front (FUNK). Following an appeal on the 18th, there are statements by Sihanouk and the FUNK/RGNU on 19 and 20 January, respectively, protesting U.S. involvement in Cambodia and requesting that

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worldwide pressure be brought on the Nixon Administration to end its "aggression." Sihanouk's statement also calls for nations to break relations and end cooperation with Phnom Penh, to recognize the RGNLU as the sole legitimate Cambodian government, and to give "military and humanitarian" aid to "the Khmer people" who are fighting "under the banner of the FUNK."

In his statement, the text of which was carried by NCNA in English on the 21st, Sihanouk charged that the United States has never ceased its involvement in the "Cambodian civil war" and has "defrauded the Khmer people of the decisive victory which their national liberation army was on the point of winning irresistibly many times and on many occasions over the forces of the fascist traitors in Phnom Penh." This passage was omitted from an earlier NCNA Chinese-language summary of the statement, which did include Sihanouk's claim that the "new aggression" by the United States "is, from the viewpoint of the genocide of the Khmer people and the neocolonization of the Khmer country, still more serious than the aggression of 1 May 1970."

Sihanouk's 16th "message to the Khmer nation," issued on the 22d and carried by NCNA on the 23d, cites Western news reports to demonstrate the success of the insurgents in recent fighting. Congratulations on insurgent "victories" are expressed in a message from Sihanouk and Penn Nouth sent on the 23d to RGNLU Defense Minister Khieu Samphan.

PRC ATTACKS "ESCALATION" IN FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT, COMMENT

The 25 January PRC Foreign Ministry statement charges that "since the dry season set in, the Nixon government has adopted a series of grave steps to further expand its war of aggression in Indochina." It cites recent developments in Indochina to document its claim that "U.S. imperialism is wildly attempting to launch a new military adventure," and it warns that "the Chinese Government and people are closely watching the development of this scheme of the Nixon government." In listing evidence of expanded "aggression," the statement claims that the United States "directed" South Vietnamese-Cambodian Government forces to attack Cambodian insurgents and "dispatched U.S. planes, warships, and military 'advisers' to take a direct part in the war."

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The statement promises routinely that China will be firm in its backing for the three Indochinese peoples. It endorses the DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements of the 19th and 20th and the statements from Sihanouk and from the FUNK and RGNU on the 19th and 20th--statements previously welcomed in a 22 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which scored the U.S. role in Cambodia, including the alleged use of U.S. "ground 'advisers.'" The article claimed that "now people can clearly see that Nixon simply does not hope the war in Indochina to be 'over'; instead, he is racking his brains to drag on and expand his war of aggression."

Secretary Laird is sharply attacked in a 24 January NCNA commentary by Ou Ping pegged to his 20 January press conference. Observing that Laird "was put on the spot" by the reporters, Ou Ping notes that they criticized the use of U.S. planes and helicopters in Cambodia and said that U.S. actions went beyond the scope of policies spelled out last year. Ou Ping then recalls President Nixon's 30 June speech on the Cambodian action, saying the President had "pretended to 'guarantee' that the United States would no longer give 'air or logistical support to the Lon Nol regime.'"

Ou Ping says that Laird was first embarrassed by the reporters but then became angry and "bluntly replied 'as long as I remain in my present post, I must continue to recommend the use of air forces in Laos and Cambodia.'" Ou Ping says that this is entirely consistent with Laird's defense of the massive air strikes against the DRV two months ago and is merely the latest demonstration that "imperialists" see "aggression" as their duty. The commentator adds that one cannot expect "U.S. imperialism" to act with reason and that the only way to deal with it is to "defeat it totally with crushing blows." The Indochinese people, Ou Ping adds, "have never had any illusion about U.S. imperialism, nor will they pay any heed to the threats of Laird and his ilk."

The contrast between Peking's calls for a military solution in Indochina and Hanoi's efforts on the diplomatic front is currently underlined: A 25 January NCNA account of a 23 January NHAN DAN Commentator article on the past two years of the Paris talks manages to make no mention of the talks themselves, instead dwelling on evidence of U.S. "aggression" and Commentator's attacks on the Vietnamization program.

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MOSCOW PLAYS UP "ESCALATION," NOTES U.S. DOMESTIC CRITICISM

Moscow comment continues to portray the United States as widening the Indochina conflict. TASS Observer Kharkov on the 21st, reporting on Secretary Laird's press conference the day before, said his "blunt" statement that "the present situation in Cambodia is of critical importance for the success of the Vietnamization program" means, "as the American press itself noted," a "considerable enlargement of the framework of the Nixon Doctrine, of which Vietnamization is the very core." An Orekhov commentary in PRAVDA on the 23d singled out Laird's claim that "the American military command has the right to undertake anything it can for the protection of American troops that remain in South Vietnam" and said this is the "pretext" under which the United States has extended the war into Laos and Cambodia.

On the 20th a Radio Moscow domestic broadcast belatedly acknowledged reports of a raid by South Vietnamese paratroopers in Cambodia on the 17th. Without mentioning that the reported target of the raid was a camp where American prisoners were believed to be held, the radio said the "new provocation" was carried out by "a large unit of South Vietnamese paratroopers, accompanied by so-called American advisers, who were dropped on an area deep inside Cambodia." It is now becoming evident, the radio added, that "the notorious American advisers, in great numbers, are conducting combat operations against the patriots."

The matter of advisers was also brought up in a domestic news item on the 26th. It quoted the New York TIMES as saying that there are plans for U.S. representatives to check on the effectiveness of the Cambodians' use of American arms and equipment--"thus the matter in question is the dispatch to Cambodia of American military advisers, which is in flagrant contradiction with the decision of the U.S. Congress."

Also on the 26th, TASS said a Pentagon spokesman "admitted that the United States is training Cambodian troops in South Vietnam and Thailand." On the 23d, Radio Moscow had reported U.S. construction of "a helicopter base" in Cambodia to support Saigon and Phnom Penh forces.

Moscow promptly hailed the communist raid on Phnom Penh airport on the 22d, alleging that it "has further worsened the position of the Phnom Penh authorities." A Radio Moscow

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report the next day played the same theme in noting that the raid "dealt a colossal blow to the prestige of Lon Nol" and added that Washington is "hastening to repair the damage."

Other Moscow reportage and comment plays upon U.S. domestic opposition, particularly among members of Congress, to Administration policy in Indochina. A TASS Washington dispatch on the 23d reported that Washington's "escalation of the war against Cambodia is being widely and sharply condemned in the American press, with even conservative papers joining in indicting the Administration for violating the will of Congress and its own promises to bring the war in Southeast Asia to an end." In a similar vein, Radio Moscow commented on the 22d that the new session of the U.S. Congress has "opened against the background of increasing American aggression in Indochina." President Nixon, it added, "has thrown a new challenge to Congress, ignoring its decisions prohibiting a repetition of armed intrusion into Cambodia." In the same context, Soviet media have publicized criticism of Administration policy by Senators Mansfield, Muskie, Church, McGovern, and Aiken.

PRAVDA ON PARIS TALKS A PRAVDA article on the 26th, reported by TASS, attributes the "disappointing results" of the Paris peace talks to Washington's "unwillingness to heed sober advice." Noting that the United States has consistently rejected proposals from the other side and has been "widening its aggression to Cambodia and Laos," the article says the only way to break the present deadlock is by "taking a realistic approach to the solution of the Vietnam problem; this was stressed once again at the 100th meeting in Paris by Xuan Thuy," who "urged the American side to begin serious talks."

HANOI, FRONT BLAME NIXON FOR TWO-YEAR DEADLOCK AT PARIS TALKS

Both the DRV and PRG delegates at the 100th session of the Paris talks on 21 January reviewed the conference's work of the past two years. The 100th session and the second anniversary of the talks also occasioned a lengthy 23 January NHAN DAN Commentator article broadcast that day by Hanoi radio and reviewed by VNA. Front comment includes a 21 January LPA Commentator article, carried by LPA that day and broadcast by Liberation Radio on the following day, and a Liberation Radio station commentary on the 22d. The comment uniformly places the blame on the Nixon Administration for all delays at Paris and urges an early solution to the Vietnam problem on the basis of the PRG's proposals.

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The NHAN DAN Commentator article, like Xuan Thuy at the Paris session, maintains that President Nixon has tried for two years to create a position of strength on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. Commentator says that during the past 100 sessions, the U.S. delegation "wasted time pleading for Nixon's aggressive policy and colonialist plot that were reflected in his warlike eight-point plan of 14 May and his five-point proposal of 7 October 1970. The delegation has resorted to deceitful maneuvers--such as the POW problem--to fool public opinion." The article adds: "When Nixon had to cope with public pressure, he stated that the conference had made progress. When he wanted to undermine the conference, he approved the resignation of the U.S. delegation's chief and refused to appoint a successor for half a year."

Like the delegates at Paris, the Commentator article and Front comment score the U.S. position on a troop withdrawal and the Vietnamese right to self-determination and say that the PRG's solution on these two fundamental issues "is correct, rational, sensible, clear, and comprehensive." Commentator routinely denounces the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization as policies aimed at continuing aggression.

Both PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy in their reviews of the history of the Paris sessions scored the U.S. position on mutual troop withdrawal and self-determination for the South Vietnamese, but VNA reported only the details of Mme. Binh's remarks. The VNA and LPA accounts both note that she spelled out the PRG's proposals on these basic issues.

The VNA account also duly reports that Mme. Binh condemned the Nixon Administration for intensifying the war in the South and for "repeatedly bombing and strafing North Vietnam, escalating the war in Laos, and expanding the war to Cambodia." VNA notes Xuan Thuy's remarks on U.S. bombings and shellings of the DRV but, inexplicably, omits his remarks on escalation in Cambodia.

VNA's account of the allied delegates' presentations brusquely notes that "for his part, the U.S. negotiator did his best to argue for the policy which the Nixon Administration has carried out over the past two years--prolong and expand the war of aggression, drive the Paris conference on Vietnam into a deadlock, and threaten to sabotage it. Speaking in his turn, the delegate of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration exerted his energies to plead for his U.S. master."

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HANOI SCORES GVN METHOD OF RELEASE OF PRISONERS TO DRV

Hanoi reacts to the planned 24 January GVN release of a number of disabled North Vietnamese prisoners with two "authorized" VNA statements on the 23d. And the methods of the release are scored in a 25 January DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement. Consistent with past Hanoi practice, the statement obfuscates the fact that North Vietnam had actually received the prisoners, and scores the GVN for "deliberately refusing" to comply with DRV provisions on the release of 37 Vietnamese "illegally arrested in South Vietnam." (Western reports following the release on the 24th said that three of the 40 prisoners to be released had decided not to return to the DRV at the last moment.)

The foreign ministry spokesman's statement scored the GVN for taking advantage of the prisoner release and for "introducing into the demilitarized zone troops, weapons, and war means including 25 M-113 armored personnel carriers in order to conduct military acts." It "strongly protested against and denounced . . . these brazen acts" by the "U.S. puppets."

Complaints about the GVN's use of M-113 armored vehicles to take the "arrested persons" to the Ben Hai River had been aired in a radio commentary on the 24th, which was broadcast at about the time of the actual release. As documentation of the danger, the broadcast said that the allies had shelled the southern part of the DMZ "from 1800 to 2330 Hanoi time" on the 23d. It also assailed the International Red Cross for allowing the procedure, saying that it had no right to intervene and insisted on previous DRV stipulations.

The first indication that the DRV objected to the GVN's method of release--which GVN Ambassador Lam had presented to the DRV delegation in Paris at the 14 January Paris session--came in a 23 January VNA "authorized" statement--first released at 0430 GMT. The VNA statement recalls that a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement had been released on 24 December following GVN Foreign Minister Lam's announcement on the 22d of the planned release of a number of Vietnamese prisoners as a humanitarian gesture for Tet. VNA repeats the assertion of the spokesman that if any detained "patriots" were released and desired to live in the North they would be

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received and accepted by the DRV Government. The VNA statement then asserted that it was "authorized to make it clear"

that the present release and reception of these people must be carried out in the same way as the release and reception on 11 July 1970.* Specifically, these people will be transported by sea and released near the DRV territorial waters at the mouth of the Cua Tung River at 1000 hours Hanoi time on 24 January. All military activities within the release area must be stopped. The Americans and puppets must provide these people with means so that they may steer themselves toward the mouth of the Cua Tung River. No other person is authorized to accompany them. No organization or individual is allowed to take advantage of this event to illegally infiltrate the DRV's airspace, territorial waters, or territory.

The stipulations of the prisoner release were again outlined in a second VNA authorized statement on the 23d, that one released by VNA English at 1736 GMT--less than two hours after VNA had carried the earlier authorized statement which had been broadcast by Hanoi radio early that morning. The second statement did add a passage that was not in the first: it declared that "the DRV Government categorically rejects all the schemes of the U.S.-puppets to contravene the above stated stipulations and emphasized that should the U.S. and the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration obstinately seek to carry out their dark scheme they would have to bear full responsibility for all the consequences."

* DRV media are not known to have mentioned the actual release on 11 July 1970 of 62 "wounded" North Vietnamese prisoners and a group of fishermen. But a VNA "authorized" statement on 23 June had spelled out the stipulations of the release which included the provisions of releasing the prisoners at the 17th parallel or at a place adjacent to the sea areas of the DRV. See the TRENDS of 24 June 1970, page 5.

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DRV POLITBURO MEMBER TRUONG CHINH REAPPEARS IN PUBLIC

The first report in DRV media since late October of a public appearance by VWP Politburo member Truong Chinh came on 27 January when VNA said he attended a Vietnam Fatherland Front meeting--along with President Ton Duc Thang--on 26 January to welcome the Lunar new year. The last public function that Truong Chinh was reported as attending was the 19-22 October session of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee. An 11 January East Berlin ADN report had said that he was in East Germany "taking a cure" and that he was received on the 11th by SED Politburo member Friedrich Ebert.* DRV media maintained silence on his reported trip to the GDR.

Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan--who left Hungary on 30 December, according to Budapest's MTI, after heading the DRV delegation to the 10th Hungarian party congress--was reported as returning to North Vietnam on 14 January, according to VNA on the 15th. His whereabouts during the two-week period is unknown. On 26 January, VNA reports that he was a member of the delegation which paid respects at the GDR embassy to the memory of SED Politburo member Hermann Matern.

* See the TRENDS of 13 January, page 7-8.

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LAOS: SOUTHANOVONG ENVOY LEAVES VIENTIANE FOR "INSTRUCTIONS"

The Pathet Lao radio on 22 January reported cryptically that Souphanouvong's special envoy Thao Souk Vongvane, prior to his departure from Vientiane for Sam Neua, said that due to "stalling" by the Souvanna Phouma side he had to return for "further instructions" but hoped to come back to Vientiane "soon." The radio does not refer in this connection to the 31 December Pathet Lao proposal outlining conditions for a bombing halt that would make it possible for the long-sought meeting of plenipotentiaries to be held in Khang Khay. However, earlier propaganda had continued to press the proposal and urge a suitable reply from Souvanna. And a 14 January "special announcement" of the NLDR Central Committee, broadcast by the Pathet Lao radio the next day, recounted past proposals and placed primary responsibility on the Americans and "the ultrarightist clique in Vientiane" for delaying agreement.

Judging from the Pathet Lao radio report, Souk in his departure statement did not mention that there had been talks on 21 January. However, a Vientiane broadcast on the 22d reported that at talks the day before Souvanna had proposed that the plenipotentiaries' meeting be held in Luang Prabang "because agreement could not be reached on the Khang Khay site"--a site which Souvanna had proposed on 25 June. In noting Souk's arrival in Sam Neua on the 27th "to confer with and report to Prince Souphanouvong," the Pathet Lao radio said merely that "all" of the "many reasonable proposals" made by Souk had been rejected by Souvanna.

* The "new proposal" presented by Souk on 31 December is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 January 1971, pages 10-11.

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PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PEKING PRESSES LINE ON OPPOSITION TO SUPERPOWER DOMINANCE

Peking has been making prominent use of its line on resistance by "medium-sized and small countries" against superpower dominance. This line has been applied to a wide variety of subjects, including Latin American claims to territorial waters, Ecuador's seizure of American fishing boats, Panamanian demands for sovereignty over the canal, OPEC negotiations with Western oil companies, and objections to superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Regarding the latter, a 25 January NCNA report on the Commonwealth conference in Singapore quoted Ceylon's Prime Minister as deplored the establishment of a U.S.-British naval base at Diego Garcia Island and warning against great-power expansion into the Indian Ocean.

While seeking to demonstrate the PRC's common interests with the lesser powers, Peking is stressing at the same time that its resurgence on the international scene does not portend an attempt to acquire superpower status. A disclaimer of any such intent was introduced in Peking's New Year's Day Joint editorial, and the point was made even more explicit in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 23 January lauding the Latin American countries for resisting "big-nation hegemony." Noting that the United States has called China a potential superpower, "implying that China may also squeeze into the ranks of superpowers some day," the editorial declared that the PRC will never seek big-power status and "will forever stand side by side with all nations" subjected to superpower pressure.

The line on superpowers, which emerged in mid-1970, serves Peking's campaign for expanding relations with a broad range of countries, enhancing the PRC's international standing, and preparing the ground for acquiring a voice in international forums. As reflected in the standard refrain expressing support for countries safeguarding their "national independence and state sovereignty," this line is designed to appeal to established governments and to growing forces of economic nationalism rather than to revolutionary insurgencies. It also seems aimed at

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developing a role for Peking in efforts, especially among third world countries, to coordinate moves in defense of national and economic interests against the superpowers. Significantly, the 23 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, like other recent comment, cited the Lusaka conference of nonaligned countries and the UN silver anniversary session last year as forums at which nations of the third world strengthened their unity.

Peking's treatment of actions and plans by Latin American countries to press their claims to 200-mile territorial sea limits has contained hints of a bid for an active Chinese role in future deliberations on issues affecting the PRC. Thus, a 17 January NCNA account of a Latin American conference on ocean rights praised the "collective action" taken at the conference and quoted participants as urging "common action" with Asian and African countries at the 1973 Geneva Conference on the law of the sea.* More directly, in commenting on the establishment of PRC-Chilean diplomatic relations (announced on 5 January), Peking quoted the Chilean foreign minister as saying that international cooperation requires the participation of the PRC and that for this reason an increasing number of countries support its membership in the UN.

Peking's own comment on the latter occasion indicated much about the purposes underlying its current line. A PEOPLE DAILY editorial on 7 January interpreted the developments in Chile, including Allende's accession to power, as demonstrating that in Latin America today "whoever can defend national independence and state sovereignty will win the support of the people." In an unusual but revealing formulation reflecting Peking's shift from a doctrinaire to a flexible approach, the editorial claimed that the measures being undertaken by the Chilean Government will have "a good effect on the promotion of national and democratic movements in Latin America." Chinese comment on Latin America in recent years has laid primary stress on revolutionary themes, denigrating the peaceful path to power; and even after Allende's election Peking tread cautiously in welcoming a regime that had arrived by the parliamentary road, notwithstanding that regime's commitment to establish relations with the PRC and to reduce U.S. influence in the country.

* Peking's treatment of ocean rights, including its own claims off the East Asian coast, is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 December 1970, pages 17-19.

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EVOLUTION OF PEKING'S APPROACH TO TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP

Peking's line on superpowers represents the latest phase in its attempt to come to terms with Soviet and U.S. power and to acquire leverage in the triangular relationship. During the period of isolationist withdrawal following Peking's rejection of appeals for communist unity in the mid-1960's, the Chinese portrayal of the international environment was dominated by a picture of Soviet-U.S. "encirclement" and containment of China. After the election of President Nixon there were signs that Peking hoped to use the United States as a counterpoise to the Soviets. At that time Peking called for resumption of the Warsaw talks with representatives of the incoming Administration, and its comment on the election and inauguration was noncommittal on substantive Sino-U.S. issues while warning Washington not to pursue Soviet-U.S. cooperation at the expense of other interests. Peking canceled the Warsaw session just prior to its scheduled date of 26 February 1969, ostensibly in reaction to the U.S. acceptance of a Chinese defector but possibly out of a judgment that the new Administration intended to follow a hard line on China while concentrating on relations with Moscow. During the period of Sino-Soviet border tension and clashes, Peking's comment reflected a siege mentality which viewed its two major rivals as engaged in joint anti-Chinese efforts.

After the opening of the Sino-Soviet border talks on 20 October 1969 and an accompanying reduction in tension, Peking again showed an appreciation of uses to which the triangular relationship could be put. This was reflected, for example, in successive reports transmitted by NCNA on 14 December 1969 juxtaposing an announcement on the recess of the Sino-Soviet talks to permit the top two Soviet negotiators to return to Moscow that day and a report on a meeting in Warsaw of U.S. and PRC representatives three days earlier. The latter meeting led to the resumption of the regular Warsaw talks running parallel to the Peking talks. The Chinese later postponed a session (scheduled for 20 May 1970) in reaction to the U.S. incursion into Cambodia, but in doing so they carefully left the door open for future meetings.

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The emergence of the line on superpowers in mid-1970 appeared to be prompted by President Nixon's remarks on the Middle East in his 1 July television interview in which he spoke of the dangers of a collision of the superpowers in that area. Speaking at the Iraqi embassy on 16 July, Li Hsien-nien assailed the notion of a balance of power in the Middle East as an effort by the superpowers to contend for spheres of influence there. Since then Peking has tailored this theme to cases of Soviet-U.S. "collusion and contention" throughout the world.

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POLAND

REGIME DEMANDS "DISCIPLINE," CONCILIATES COASTAL WORKERS

The continuing crisis facing the Gierek regime is reflected in an increasing incidence of warnings about "demagogery" and demands for "discipline" in the central media. Strikes and work stoppages in the coastal cities triggered a visit there by the top leaders on 24-25 January--as the shipyard workers had long demanded.

Polish media have only briefly acknowledged the occurrence of a strike by shipyard workers in Szczecin which, according to Western news sources, broke out on the 22d, was joined by public transport and other workers, and was settled by the visit of First Secretary Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz to that city on the 24th. The next day the Warsaw domestic service carried a Szczecin-dated report insisting that "there is absolutely no tension in our city"; transport is functioning "without delays, and work in the port loading ships is proceeding according to plan." The report added that the top leaders' visit to the shipyard was the leading topic of discussion among the populace and that "satisfaction over the fact that Szczecin has returned to completely normal life and work is noticeable throughout the city."

The Warsaw domestic service on the 25th reported the meeting involving the top leaders the day before at the Szczecin Adolf Warski Shipyards, "where recently work has been discontinued once again." Without revealing the exact nature of the workers' demands, the report said Gierek "took a stand regarding the problems put forward by the shipbuilders" while the workers, "with particular emotion, expressed confidence in Edward Gierek and in the process of renewal which has been initiated." An end to the strike was claimed: "Recognizing that support for the new leadership is best expressed by deeds, the shipbuilders have resumed normal work." Indicating that the conduct of the public order authorities during the December riots was a leading issue at this meeting, the report said the meeting was also attended by Defense Minister Jaruzelski and new Interior Minister Frantiszek Szlachcic.

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Only the day before the Szczecin meeting, Szlachcic had replaced former Interior Minister Kazimierz Switala, recalled from the post for "health reasons." Switala had taken over the Interior Ministry post from Moczar at the end of an earlier crisis period--the March 1968 student riots. PAP on the 25th said Szlachcic was also present at the top leaders' meeting with shipyard workers at Gdansk the day after the Szczecin meeting.

PAP's report implied a more acrimonious meeting at the port of Gdansk, where there have apparently been almost continuous discussion meetings since the December riots, attended at various times by sizeable portions of the Gdansk shipyard working force. The report said the "hours-long direct talk" between Gierek and Jaroszewicz and the Gdansk workers came about because "at numerous recent meetings . . . the desire had been expressed by the shipyard workers to meet with the highest representatives of the party and the government for a frank talk." The tense atmosphere of the Gdansk meeting was further reflected in PAP's report that "the delegates did not conceal their bitterness and great disapproval as regards the situation that had such serious consequences, that had resulted in a crisis of confidence between the leadership and the population--the tragic December events." The report did not claim "emotional" support for the new leaders, as at the Szczecin meeting, but said only that Gierek and Jaroszewicz were "applauded" when they called for "a production effort and creative activeness of all wise and truly committed working people" and stressed the importance of "mutual confidence."

DEMANDS FOR DISCIPLINE The progressive breakdown in work discipline in the recent period is dramatized by a letter from Premier Jaroszewicz to enterprise managers, summarized at length by the Warsaw domestic service on the 23d, the day before the leaders' visit to Szczecin. The letter charges that during "the last few weeks" enterprise directors and managers have, among other things, "tolerated a relaxation of working discipline and violation of valid regulations without undertaking decisive action to insure the normal operation of enterprises." In a significant qualifier to Gierek's promise to involve workers in decision-making, Jaroszewicz warned that "listening to the opinions" of the workers does "not under any circumstances relieve the enterprise directors and administration of the responsibility for decisions."

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The letter adds that management personnel should "in their relations with the staff adopt a realistic attitude and oppose any kind of demands which are unrealistic and demagogic."

The stand taken in the Premier's letter was explicitly backed up by an article in TRYBUNA LUDU on the 24th. As reviewed in the Warsaw domestic service, the article demands "solid work" and "social discipline" and declares that an atmosphere of "anarchy and demagogy, which some would like to create," militates against the "constructive action which we all need most." Claiming that "the immense majority of the working class" agrees with this stand, it stresses the need for "all citizens . . . to be aware of this."

Continuing the concerted campaign, the same paper the next day carried an article entitled "Responsibility and Discipline." Demanding "conscious, general discipline," this article asserts that "all those who do not understand it act against themselves and increase the burden carried by the whole working society." Addressing itself to both managers and workers, the article warns that "it is inadmissible to make unrealistic promises, as well as to put forth claims whose impracticality is obvious."

MOSCOW DRAWS FIRST ANALOGY BETWEEN POLISH, CZECHOSLOVAK EVENTS

On the 22d, the day the Szczecin strike broke out, Radio Moscow carried a talk by Korionov which for the first time in Soviet comment drew an explicit parallel between the Polish disorders and the Czechoslovak developments of 1968-69. The commentary seemed contrived primarily to justify Moscow's self-appointed role as watchdog over the "socialist" character of countries in its orbit, with audiences in the more independently oriented communist states as well as critics in the noncommunist world in mind: Thus it was broadcast in Romanian, Serbocroatian, Vietnamese, Korean, and the languages of several noncommunist areas. It was not broadcast to Poland or to other members of the Warsaw Five, and nothing like it has appeared in Soviet domestic radio or press media to date.

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The Polish events, Korionov said, "showed once again that the internal and external enemies of socialism do all they can to derive benefits from the difficulties which occur," and "they attempt also to liquidate the people's socialist gains." He continued: "During these events, as during the political crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1969, it became immediately clear that external and internal antisocialist forces worked in a coordinated way." After citing Gierek's assurances of solidarity with the USSR and the socialist camp, the commentator declared that "the course of events shows clearly how necessary it is to be uncompromising in the struggle against the revisionist and nationalist danger which actually opens the road to antisocialist and counter-revolutionary forces."

Echoes of the Brezhnev doctrine came through sharply in Korionov's comment that "it is becoming increasingly clear that the ruling communist governments have a vast internationalist responsibility for preserving socialist gains," and "life shows that the joint actions of the socialist countries" are of prime importance in the struggle against imperialism and for peace.

TASS on the 25th had carried a cryptic report of the Polish leaders' visits to Szczecin and Gdansk. Citing PAP, the report said only that Gierek and Jaroszewicz "met representatives of the personnel of shipbuilding enterprises" and that "the subject of the talk was pressing political and economic problems of the country." Prior to the Korionov commentary, Moscow's infrequent original commentaries on the Polish developments since the December riots had used restrained language in conveying Soviet concern to keep the lid on popular pressures for reform in that country. Thus, an Averchenko report in the 14 January PRAVDA, entitled "The Party and the People Have One Goal," stressed the Polish rank-and-file party members' steadfast adherence to orthodox Marxist-Leninist principles and their loyalty to the alliance with the USSR.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PRAVDA REPORTS STATEMENT THAT BREZHNEV "HEAD" OF POLITBURO

For the first time since the question of the leadership of the Politburo was raised at the 1966 party congress, some central Soviet newspapers have carried a local leader's statement that Brezhnev heads the top collective body. The formulation, "the Politburo headed by General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev," was used by Dagestan First Secretary M.-S.I. Umakhanov at the 19 January 50th Dagestan anniversary in Makhachkala and reported in PRAVDA, SOVIET RUSSIA and RURAL LIFE on 20 January.

Caution or disagreement, however, was suggested by the failure of other central papers to publish the formulation in their reports. It seemed a matter of course for SOCIALIST INDUSTRY and RED STAR, which carried only a few paragraphs on the ceremony, to omit the formulation, but KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, TRUD, IZVESTIYA and MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA carried long versions comparable to PRAVDA's, without the paragraph containing the formulation. (A week earlier, on 12 January, RED STAR had published an article by Vice Admiral I. Rudnev which asserted that party organizations are headed by collectives--"bureaus and committees"--rather than by individuals.)

At the 1966 congress a raykom secretary had stated that the new Politburo would be headed by a General Secretary (PRAVDA, 3 April 1966), but this unique statement turned out to be abortive. Since then, the formulation "Politburo headed by Brezhnev" has been used four times, but only locally, in the pro-Brezhnev areas of Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan. Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev used it at an April 1969 Kazakh Central Committee plenum (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 17 April 1969) and at the November 1969 Kazakh Congress of Kolkhozniks (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 18 November 1969). Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan used it at the August 1970 Kazakh 50th anniversary (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 29 August 1970). At the October 1970 Azerbaydzhan 50th anniversary an honorary presidium was elected consisting of the Politburo headed by Brezhnev, according to the 3 October BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, but the central press deleted the clause "headed by Brezhnev."

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In addition to singling out Brezhnev, Umakhanov also appeared to snub RSFSR Premier Voronov, who had come to Makhachkala to present Dagestan with an Order of the October Revolution on its anniversary. In Voronov's presence, Umakhanov thanked the Central Committee and Politburo headed by Brezhnev for their "constant fatherly attention and comprehensive help" to Dagestan after the 14-15 May 1970 Dagestan earthquake. He expressed no gratitude to the RSFSR government or to Voronov, who was the only Soviet leader to visit Dagestan after the earthquake (SOVIET RUSSIA, 21 May 1970).

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

ANHWEI BECOMES SEVENTH PROVINCE TO FORM PARTY COMMITTEE

On 23 January NCNA reported the establishment of the Anhwei Provincial CCP Committee, the seventh such provincial-level party committee to be set up within 7 weeks. Some 30 percent of China's population now comes under the new committees.

Adhering to the same rigid format used in announcing the other provincial party committees, NCNA reported that a provincial party congress attended by 1,150 delegates met in Hefei from 15 to 21 January and elected the 79 members and 12 alternates to the new provincial committee.* Although figures on the size of the entire former party committee are not available, the five-man group which heads the new committee is smaller than the former 15-man secretariat.

Three military men, one veteran cadre, and one peasant representative claimed the five secretarial positions on the committee, formed, as in the case of the other provincial committees, on the basis of the "three-in-one alliance" of old, middle-aged, and young. All five are local leaders with concurrent positions in Anhwei's civilian-military power structure. Li Te-sheng, alternate Politburo member, director of the PLA General Political Department, and chairman of the revolutionary committee, who was sent into Anhwei in 1967 to restore order among factional Red Guard units as commander of the Anhwei Military District, was named first secretary. He was also identified for the first time as head of the provincial party nucleus group.

Presumably Li, because of his central duties in Peking, will delegate considerable power and authority to Sung Pei-chang, a local military figure and a vice chairman of the provincial

* The Anhwei announcement came only 8 days after the provincial radio claimed new party committees for the "overwhelming majority" of municipalities and counties in the province. Similar claims were also made by the provincial radios in Hunan and Kwangtung just before they set up their party committees last month.

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revolutionary committee, who was named secretary. Li Chen-chih, vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee and a former secretary on the old party committee, was named a deputy secretary. Kuo Hung-chih, a model production brigade leader and a Central Committee alternate member with responsibility on the provincial revolutionary committee, was also named a deputy secretary, as was Liung Chi-ching, former military leader from Kiangsu, recently transferred to Anhwei where he became political commissar of the Anhwei Military District.

With the exception of Hopeh's provincial chief, Li Hsueh-feng, all Politburo members who are also chairmen of provincial revolutionary committees have now been placed at the head of rebuilt party committees in their respective provincial bailiwicks. The other provinces with new committees but without a Politburo chief--Mao's native province of Hunan, Huang Yung-sheng's stronghold of Kwangtung, and traditional pacesetter Kiangsi--possessed other obvious claims for early selection.

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